Clientelism, Governance and Administrative Reforms: Implementation of Social Policy in Croatia

PhD Project Proposal

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Abstract
The aim of this PhD project is to analyze the outcomes of administrative reform in Croatia while looking at social policies. In Croatia, the transformation of governance practices towards harmonization with Western administrative reform paradigms started in 2000. Efforts were made therein to reform the management of social policies as the core element of public administration. The proclaimed objectives of the incumbents were: greater effectiveness, efficiency and—partly—equity. Nowadays, as Croatia prepares for EU membership, the results of those reforms are limited and uneven, generating various unintended and unexpected consequences, particularly evident in the implementation management of social policies. While seeking to account for why this has been the case, this PhD project proposes an explanation which connects different outcomes of administrative reforms with modes of politician-citizen linkages that are dominant in specific social policies.

In consideration of reform outcomes, specific research focus is placed on the implementation management which is viewed as operational governance. It is expected that the evidence of reformed implementation management will be connected with prevalence of programmatic policy competition while the evidence on absence, or modified adaptation, of reform elements in implementation management will be in strong relation with the existence of direct or mediated clientelistic linkage of politicians with citizens. In the former mode of politician-citizen linkages clients of clientelistic exchange are policy beneficiaries, while in later one exchange is done with service providers-implementers of specific social policy. To test proposed causal explanation this PhD project uses process tracing format and policies oriented toward war veterans, elderly and children are selected as cases resembling most elements of independent variable, three modes of politician-citizens linkages.

Introduction

The study of reforms in relation to public policies has, thus far, been divided between literature which traces different reform practices in developed, Western democracies, and that which addresses reforms in other contexts, including new democracies, countries in transition, post-conflict societies, and societies in the developing world. Of course, any attempt to break down this distinction has to deal with the fact that the 'prevailing conditions' in different societies are very different. This means that reforms implemented in one setting can never be merely transplanted to another, without the specific historical legacies and political agency rendering the effects of these reforms very different. At the same time, models developed in one context do have an impact, albeit not always the desired one, when implemented elsewhere. In the end, understandings of real reform efforts can refine and elaborate models of the reform process and be relevant in a broader range of societies.

The aim of this PhD project is to address what occurs in a transition society such as Croatia, experiencing a transition not only from a planned to a free market economy, and from a single party to a multi-party system, but also experiencing state-building, war and post-war transition and consolidation. In short, in an area such as social policy, where there was a growing reform consensus, reform efforts can be judged as having limited, and uneven, results in different social policy areas. That is most evident in the implementation conceived as operational governance of specific social policies, where reformed implementation management co-exists with non-reformed or selectively reformed–even anomalous- modes of operational governance. The main research question of this PhD project is thus which variables caused such outcomes of administrative reforms in the implementation management of specific social policy? Why and how the implementation management in some social policies was transformed according to reformist guidelines, why in some policies just certain elements of reforms were selected and integrated with modification, and why in some others the reform did not take place at all. The next section provides the discussion of literature on governance and public administration reform together with literature on political competition and short overview of real–world events that provided inspiration and background for this PhD project. The working hypothesis, analytical framework and illustration of logic of causality are explained in the second section. The last section presents methodology chosen for providing answers to posed research questions.

Origins and rationale of the PhD project: literature and real-world background

The growing complexity of modern societies along with the related necessity to decrease the rigidity of government institutions and of the decision-making process has in recent decades placed administrative reforms high on political and scholarly agenda. In a quest to redefine the role that political and administrative institutions have in advanced democracies two reform waves emerged in 1980s and 1990s. Older reform was inspired by New Public Management paradigm originating in the eighties as the reaction to diagnoses of government lacking flexibility (Pierre, 2012; Peters, 2011). Management reform continued during the nineteen-nineties when the governance turn redefined the role for government and public bureaucracy (Pierre, 2012) while demarcating the abandonment of hierarchy and elitism towards inclusive forms of participation in

social coordination based on interest or social solidarity (Hoppe, 2010). In the years to come both governance and management reform significantly affected the reality of public administration and, although representing distinct paradigms, in practice these were overlapping, merging and enforcing each other (Klijn, 2012).

In the transformation introduced in the public sector by the reformist nature of New Public Management (NPM), the focus was on performance and serving clients, while importing managerialist ideas and techniques into public bureaucracy functioning. Envisioning effective, efficient and better-quality public service, management reform supplemented input-based control with output-based measurement and management (Pierre, 2012). Part of the logic of the stimulation of effectiveness and efficiency was thus intertwined with the steering of the implementation of a large portion of services towards non-governmental, private, actors and relatively autonomous agencies within the public sector, as well as towards reducing the control of political executive over policies and praise for the capacity of public managers (Peters, 2011). In real life of public administration, NPM implied the separation of policy formation and policy implementation, which was accompanied with trends of disaggregation, agentification, privatization and contracting out governmental services (Klijn, 2012).

The second reform trend in literature is known as 'participatory governance', 'new governance' or just as 'governance' if using the term in the sense of a strategy employed to "govern and manipulate the design of institutions and mechanisms in order to shape choices and preferences" (Levi-Faur, 2012:8). Governance as a reform strategy thus guided redefinition of structures, processes, and roles of public sector in order to improve democratic quality of the public service (Pierre, 2012). This reform wave found its justification in primarily democratic principles (as opposed to effectiveness and efficiency linked with NPM) and by stressing the participation of citizens in managing and creating public policies (Peters, 2011). With the usage of horizontal types of steering (network management, meta-governance), governance reform goals included not only the enhancement of cooperation between government and other actors, but also the improvement of horizontal coordination among governmental organizations (Klijn, 2012).

Although governance and management reform originated from a different set of normative beliefs, ideas, objectives and theoretical backgrounds, in real life they reinforced each other with practitioners, politicians and managers, often combining their elements in policy documents and practice. In the last decade the practical merge of elements originating from NPM and governance transcended to scientific discussions; nowadays, for example, governance literature is embracing the idea of NPM's performance indicators while NPM literature has integrated the discussion on horizontal steering mechanisms (Klijn, 2012). In order to emphasize the hybrid character of modern administrative systems and layered nature of reform waves, Christensen and Laegreid (2007, 2012: 259) use the label "post-NPM" while referring to current public sector reforms in which NPM elements still exist but are supplemented by other, mainly governance, reformist initiatives. Post-NPM reform movement, thus, encompasses different governing choices of dealing with increased complexity, disintegration and fragmentation brought by application of NPM's logic in public sector organizations. On the one hand, post-NPM reform places emphasis on the usage of network management and partnership arrangements, elements of governance reform, as a path toward better coordination and coherence in public policy (Christensen and Laegreid, 2012). On the other hand, as the political executive has demonstrated reluctance to release political control over devolved or sole-standing administrative structures, the aim of

restoring public sector organization to situation of greater integration can be connected with a strategy of re-establishing the hierarchy and strengthening central capacity and control over policies (Halligan, 2006, Christensen and Laegreid, 2012).

Contemporary age of governance, if using the term in a sense of contemporary phase in the evolution of Western government (Hill and Hupe, 2009), is thus marked with a wide range of practices with the existence of multiple, rather than a single, dominant models (Politt and Bouckaert, 2011). Accordingly, Pierre and Peters (2000) have developed three scenarios that lead to three models of governance in Western democracies: "reassertring control", "letting other regimes rule" and "communitarianism, deliberation and direct democracy". In the similar line, Hill and Hupe (2009) recognize three modes of governance in relation to the main control mechanism: authority, transaction and persuasion. The plurality of governance modes is especially evident in the implementation of public policies. So as to demonstrate this, Hill and Hupe (2009) have developed three perspectives on managing implementation, which they conceive as a part of governance, namely its operational part. While looking at the system, organization and individual scale of operational governance, they distinguish enforcement, performance and co-production as action perspectives that correspond to above-mentioned governance modes. Each of these perspectives implies different activities for managing policy process (system scale), managing inter-organizational relation (organization scale) and managing internal and external contacts. Thus multiple loci on implementation management corresponds with contextualized working which can, in practice, result in both congruous and incongruous modes of operational governance. This means that in a single state not just one mode may be prevalent. Moreover, Hupe and Hill (2009) themselves point out that multiple-modes of operational governance can be present in one policy area, or even in one specific policy in which, e.g., the transaction mode on the individual street-level level of implementation can co-exist with the authority mode of inter-organizational relations.

In the consideration of administrative reform practices and, consequential to the (co-) existence of various forms of governance and operational governance, the cases of young democracies, such as Croatia or other countries of South East Europe that have during the third democratization wave undergone a transformation from communist regimes to democratic systems, appears as a problem, or at least as an exceptionally interesting research topic. Namely, a situation where a mixture of externally originated administration reforms 'meets' the no less complex transition context of South East Europe, "an extraordinary laboratory" (Stark, according to Stubbs 2005) emerges in which complex, even anomalous, modes of governance can be studied as reform's outcomes (Stubbs 2005). The outcome of the Croatian transition laboratory becomes even more interesting when we take into consideration the prevailing conditions of highly centralized governing in 1990s which disrupted the course of self-government legacy inherited from socialism, and after 2000 acted as a legacy or platform for reform movements from Western democracies.

At the beginning of nineteen- nineties, in the atmosphere of state-building, war, territorial occupation and humanitarian crisis, the Croatian political executive designed a highly centralized and politicized administrative system, slowed down the consolidation of a democratic political system and directed political development towards political authoritarianism, ethicized nationalism, and a renewed statism (Stubbs and Zrinščak 2009). At the same time, a quasi-criminal transformation of social ownership through privatization took place, resulting in the

development of a kind of clientelistic 'crony' capitalism (Bićanić and Franičević 2003), which divided the population into a small group of 'winners' and a significantly large group of 'losers'. After 1993, public administration faced etatization, numerous reorganizations of the state administration and the establishment of a new county system with limited powers (Koprić, 2009), designed as a counterbalance to historical regional (semi-) autonomous units that represented a 'logical' decentralizing framework and counterbalancing the power of urban centers which, on the whole, were less prone to support the ruling party. Political executive then justified the strengthening of the central capacity and the break with socialist polycentric governance by arguing that re-centralized governance was necessary for the process of accomplishing independence and building a state (Petak 2006). With the exception of reform of the pension system, based on an alliance between the World Bank, neo-liberal consultants, transnational pension funds, and sections of the political elite, the 1990s was a period in which there was little external influence on (re)definition of structures, processes, and roles of public sector (Stubbs and Zrinščak, 2007).

A seachange, at least in terms of the general political climate, regarding public sector reforms, came with the new millennium and the first shift of power in January 2000, which demarcated the beginning of a deeper democratization process and the efforts to accede to the EU. This opened the space for the transformation of governance practices towards harmonization with Western governance modes and reform paradigms that were promoted and partly conditioned by various international actors such as the World Bank, the European Union and the United Nations. Within this process significant efforts were made to reform social policies, as a core element of public administration, towards greater effectiveness, efficiency and, to an extent, equity. Whilst a 'crowded playground' of international actors emerged, there was general agreement on the needed reforms and of the importance of decentralization, diversification of providers, targeted services to those in need, and community-based social planning. In a sense of layered nature of administrative reforms (Christensen and Laegreid, 2012), this fused an emphasis on some of the outcome-based elements of New Public Management with a more democratic understanding of citizen participation, at least at the level of rhetoric.

Over a decade later, as Croatia prepares to become the 28th EU member state, reform efforts can be judged as having limited, and uneven, results and to have generated a number of unintended and unexpected consequences. The broad general, externally generated, reform package, with at least token domestic political support, had a different impact in different social policy areas. This is most evident in the operational part of governance, where the reformed implementation management co-exist with non-reformed or selectively reformed-even anomalous- modes of operational governance. Thus, the main research question of this PhD project is; which variables caused such results of administrative reforms in the implementation management of specific social policy? Why and how the implementation management in some social policies was transformed according to reformist guidelines, why and how in some policies just some elements of reforms were selected and integrated with modification, and why and how in others the reform did not take place. In search of answers among socio-economic and administrative-political conditions, the PhD project places focus on the reality that Croatian democratic path was marked with the fact that during 1990s and 2000s party that was in power for 17 out of 20 years based its reelection calculus, and consequently its governing, predominantly on clientelistic linkages with citizens.

Politicians and, more importantly, elected officials, have various incentives when engaging in policy process, but among them, two motives are most prominent. One of them is to govern design and implementation of public policies that will assist them in their (re)election, and the other is to accomplish effectiveness in addressing widely acknowledged public problems (Schneider and Ingram, 1993). Part of this re-election calculus is the anticipation of the ways the target population(s) will respond to policy, as well the ways others will perceive the target group and its claim/rejection of entitlement to benefits or burdens. Thus the electoral implication of a policy proposal depends partly on the power target group itself (constructed as votes, money, and propensity of the group to mobilize and act), but also on the extent to which others reject or support content and governing of policies being directed toward a particular target (Schneider and Ingram, 1993). In competitive party democracies this reelection calculus guides politicians in choosing the most appropriate mode of citizens-politicians linkages among two alternative strategic linkages: clientelistic and programmatic, with former appearing in of direct and mediated forms of clientelistic exchange (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007)

Direct clientelistic linkage of politicians and citizens refers to clientelistic exchange of between politicians and policy target population. If taking into account power and anticipated reaction of target group and other actors (Schneider and Ingram, 1993), direct clientelistic exchange associated with, for parties and their candidates, politically important target population which is accepting the role of clients in clientelistic direct exchange. Therefore, in this type of linkage, clientelistic benefits are targeted directly at the broad electoral mass and identifiable constituencies which are at the same time policy target populations. In social policy this mode of linkage is also labeled as social clientelism, with benefits including mostly club goods such as differential access to social insurance benefits, tax schemas and other, categorical social benefits (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). Benefits also may include private goods such as privileged access of the policy target group to public sector employment in the civil service (patronage) or more widely in the public and welfare sectors.

Predominately mediated clientelistic exchange, the other mode of clientelistic linkage, captures politically weak target groups which do not have a strong enough political voice or support from veto actors to resist clientelistic capture. Therefore policies in this type of linkage often become resources from mediated clientelistic exchange which primarily refers to exchange of benefits targeting supporters acting as service providers − mediators who obtain clientelistic advantages via employment affiliation. Goods being exchanged in this mode are primarily private ones interfering in public sector patronage and the extension of patronage and clientelism beyond the range of public services (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). In social policy this relates to influence on social care institutions' (care homes) hiring policy, access to public procurement contracts and outsourcing to private social care organizations as well as the influence on partnership agreements and donations to nonprofit social care providers, party affiliated, or party-linked, non-profit organizations. This type of linkage, as its supplement can also have social clientelism as an exchange mode with selected parts (perhaps based on territorial voting preferences) of the policy target population.

On the other side, programmatic policy competition does not include contingent direct or mediated exchange of club or private goods, but does involve disbursement of club goods in terms of general rules while hoping that the distributive impact will create enough support for their party or candidates. (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). Programmatic competition is based on

anticipation that citizens would not tolerate the existence of secretive, suspicious, contingent practice associated with clientelistic politicians-citizens' linkage (Flinders, 2012). In social policy, this primarily relates to policies targeting politically strong groups or to policies targeting dependent target groups but with active veto actors that show resistance toward clientelistic capture. Therefore, parties competes by presenting programmatic package of services hoping that their programs will be most appealing to specific electoral constituencies or by presenting their own competences in addressing issues the population is encountering.

Table1. MODES OF POLITICIANS-CITIZENS STRATEGIC LINKAGES

Elements	Direct clientelistic exchange with target group	Mediated clientelistic exchange with service providers	Programmatic policy Competition	
Beneficiaries of clientelistic exchange	Target group acting as broad electoral mass and identifiable constituency	Primarily party supporters acting as service providers, partially TG	NONE	
Political power of target group	Strong	Week	Apolitical	Strong
Resistance/compliance of target group to clientelistic control over policy	Compliance-acceptance of clientelistic relation	No effective resistance or acceptance – lack of political voice	No effective resistance	Effective resistance
Resistance/ compliance of veto actors in specific policy to clientelistic control over policy	No active or effective resistance	No active or effective	Effective resistance (advocacy NGOs and international organisations)	Not necessarily
Club goods as benefits in exchange	Dominant good in exchange	Partially	Disbursement in terms of general rules while hoping that distributive impact will create enough support for party or candidates.	
Private goods as benefits in exchange	Partially	Dominant good in exchange	NO	

 Adapted according to Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Schneider and Ingram, 1993

In the Croatian transitional context during the nineties the central actor of the transformation period was President Franjo Tuđman, whose party HDZ ruled in both houses of parliament. As Kasapović (2001) emphasizes, one of the preconditions for the president's domination was the charismatic-clientelist character of the ruling party, which did not incorporate clear values, but figured as a value per se. The voters' emotional attachment enabled them to rule with a vague platform of democratic transition, dominated by a single question – the sovereignty of the Croatian state. Until the second half of the 1990s, HDZ did not transform from a movement into a 'normal' political party, but rather underwent an institutionalization into a political regime. This was accomplished, among other things, by institutionalizing the means of securing support, whereby the national zeal and ideological enticements were increasingly replaced by material rewards, clientelistic relations and economic populism (Čular 2001). By means of using the state power during the 1990s, HDZ created numerous clientelistic groups that traded their privileged

access to public goods, both private and club, through ensuring political and electoral support to the party. Significant clientelistic groups with whom HDZ established direct clientelistic exchange were organized in numerous and influential alliances, and were mostly recruited from the ranks of transition losers – war participants and war disabled veterans, families of war casualties, displaced persons, refugees, political prisoners and emigrants from the ex-regime (Kasapović 2001), with emerging 'leaders' of these groups, through a network of formal and informal associations, rewarded for the support of their members.

After the death of the first president and the loss of elections in 2000 the party lost the basis of the charismatic-clientelistic model and the new party leadership headed by the new president, Ivo Sanader, subsequently abandoned Tuđman's founding program and gave the party a new 'value infusion' by redirecting its program towards priorities of accession to the EU and NATO. In the period of democratic consolidation, the abandonment of the pattern of voters' mobilization based on an emotional and non-strategic relationship with a charismatic president did not mean the abandonment of established patterns of clientelistic relationships with different voters' groups. On the contrary, after regaining power in 2003, HDZ continued the existing direct clientelistic exchange with chosen target groups of social policy, primarily war veterans which in 2000s remained powerful and organized group of voters.

Additionally, ruling party leadership invested efforts in spreading clientelistic networks and mediated exchange with service providers across specific social policies which they considered as politically irrelevant. Political irrelevance of social policies targeting groups such were elderly, persons with disability, children was a result of the overall medicalization and 'projectisized' dealing with the consequences of war in 90's what took away the voice and political power of policy beneficiaries (Stubbs, and Maglajić, 2012). With politically week target groups, these specific policies were thus considered as the appropriate platforms for usage of state resources in terms of private goods (jobs, contracts, partnership agreements) that were targeting party supporters acting as social service providers – mediators. Target groups could resist this clientelistic capture only if regaining political power through mobilization and action. Also, the capture could be eliminated with resistance of relevant policy actors, such were interest groups, or groups of international actors which acted as veto-players whose compliance or approval was important ingredient for the supplementary element of the HDZ programmatic strategy – the one 'devoted' to the modernization and Europeanization process.

As with the transformation of HDZ, the reform of public administration basically became a part of the overall package of their pro-European programmatic orientation, and in 2003, with their return to power, HDZ publicly declared commitment to the mentioned reform goals in the particular field of social policy as well. The efforts invested in the achievement of reformist goals were, however, varying in accordance with ruling party's re-election calculus related to specific policy. Thus, the described modes of politician-citizen's linkages, with emphasis on direct and mediated clientelistic exchange, for many public policies acted as filter for designing and implementing policy instruments. In accordance with exiting linkages that were dominant in specific policy, the ruling party in the role of the political executive had different strategies of accepting, resisting or selectively adapting reform elements in implementation management. To make these strategies work, various governance instruments were deployed and this ultimately brought different results of reform process in the implementation management of specific social policies.

Working hypothesis

Main hypothesis: In the Croatian transitional context, types of politicians-citizens strategic linkages caused different results of administrative reform in implementation practice of specific social policies. The mode of linkages between citizens and politicians in a specific policy determined political executive strategy toward integration of reform elements into governance of that policy, which then guided application of governance mechanisms resulting in different modes of operational governance/implementation management.

Independent variable: types of politicians-citizens strategic linkages

Conditional variables/antecedent conditions: type of capitalism – quasi criminal transformation of social ownership – "clientelistic crony capitalism", agreement on reforms - fusion of emphasis of some outcome based elements of NPM with more democratic understanding of citizens participation on level of rhetoric, transition from planned to free market economy, from single-party to multy-party system, long-lasting domination of single party in state apparatus

Causal mechanisms/intervening variables: Political executive strategy toward integration of administrative reform and application of governance instruments/mechanisms

Dependent variable: outcomes of administrative reform in implementation management = modes of operational governance

The explanation of dependent variable relies on application of Multiple Governance Framework developed by Hill and Hupe (2009) who conceive implementation as operational part of governance. In this analytical framework operational governance represents one of three broad set of activities that policy process consist on. Other two sets are constitutive and directional governance, with former encompassing activities of creating setting and later activities of giving direction toward realization of policy goals. Operational governance, as third set of activities, refers to "actual managing of that realization process" (Hill and Hupe, 2009: 126). Multiple Governance Framework is chosen because it fosters shared research focus on action and institutions, and because it enables systematic and process-oriented exploration of implementation management with locus on individuals (management of external and internal contacts), organizations (management of inter-organizational relations) and composed systems (management of policy process).

Initial development of main hypothesis:

H1. In specific social policies in which ruling party has established direct clientelistic exchange with policy target population administrative reform has resulted in operational governance that can be labeled as clientelistic enforcement. Direct clientelistic exchange between politicians and target population caused resistance to integration of reform principles into governance of specific policy, which then guided the application of governance mechanisms such as replacing service values with political values and transforming civil servants into clientelistic brokers. Reform outcome was non-reformed mode of operational governance with clientelistic enforcement perspective on managing implementation.

Non-reformed mode of operational governance implies clientelistic-bureaucratic enforcement perspective on implementation management. In this perspective, on the system scale, the state maintains the monopoly over the implementation process and administrative system often functions as a framework for clientelistic exchange and monitoring. For the management of inter-organizational relations this implies tight vertical chain of political control over de-concentrated, and rarely decentralized, implementing bodies. Here management of inter-personal contacts often implies aim of serving the clientelistic exchange. For that cause, street level workers are often placed in the role of clientelistic brokers with a high level of discretion in applying numerous yet ambiguous rules. In a metaphor, the role government takes in this mode can be best described as clientelistic guardian.

H2: In specific social policies in which ruling party has established predominantly mediated clientelistic exchange with social service providers, and to some extent direct exchange with the target group administrative reform has resulted in operational governance that can be labeled as technocratic clientelism.While recognizing the possibility to integrate some of the main reform principles, such as decentralization or diversification of providers, into clientelistic networks, the political executive chooses to introduce some of, for them relevant, reformist elements into operational governance practice. In this process reform directions were not fully followed and some elements, such as effective control mechanisms, were not included in the reform transfer package. That enabled unmonitored transformation of party clients into providers of devolved and outsourced services and even the territorially targeted decentralization with reference to certain electoral voting preferences instead of fiscal or policy capacities. The latter process gave elected politicians the possibility to spread clientelistic networks not only to service providers, but also to parts of the policy target population living in selected preferential territories or electoral units. The resulting mode of operational governance is characterized by, for the political executive, a rather effective mix of managerial and clientelistic elements and thus can be labelled as governance by technocratic clientelism (on 'technocratic clientelism' see Tendler, 1998).

This anomaly reformed mode of operational governance relies on performance through clientelistic network as a dominant perspective on implementation management. In this perspective managing policy process means design of framework for decentralisation, outsourcing and devolution to non-state actors while integrating it in the existing network of clientelistic exchange. For the management of inter-organizational relations this implies insurance of symbolic performance and compliance with service contract, but real focus on enforcement of the *clientelist* bargain. For the management of interpersonal contacts this means monitoring of clientelistic brokers acting as coordinators in organisations providing social services and enhancing compliance of street level staff with clientelistic setting. In a metaphor, the role government takes in this mode can be best described as clientelistic *capo*.

H3: In specific social policies that are part of programmatic competition, administrative reform has resulted in operational governance that resembles to some extent forms of implementation management that are dominant in advanced democracies. In these policies, reforms were often advocated by empowered target groups which emphasize participatory democratic principles, or, in the case of a week target group, by actors such as the European Union or the World Bank that were promoting good governance together with outcome-based elements of New Public Management. In line with this, the political executive strategy toward integration of reforms followed advocacy direction of powerful actors while at the same time trying to maintain as much

control as possible. To do so they were using, and adapting, some meta-governance tools such is symbolic co-production and deployment of trust and values or performance management with an emphasis on politically usable results. Outcome of this causal process was reformed implementation management which resembles mixture of modes conceptualized by Hill and Hupe (2009) as management via outputs and management via outcome as shared results.

Reformed mode of operational governance relies on combination of performance and co-production perspective on managing implementation. Management of policy process means creating framework that would enable outsourcing and devolution while opening space for engagement of non-state actors in implementation process. For management of inter-organizational relations this implies investing efforts in realization of partnership and contractual obligations. Managing external and internal contact involves fostering service orientation, professionalization and introduction of users' perspective. In this mode government is switching between the role of chairperson and the role of regulator/inspector (Hill and Hupe, 2009).

Table 2: OUTCOMES OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN IMPLEMENTATION MANAGEMENT = MODES OF OPERATIONAL GOVERNANCE

Operational activities	Label/description of mode		
	Non-reformed implementation management by clientelistic enforcement	Anomaly reformed implementation management by technocratic clientelism	Reformed implementation management toward performance and co-production perspective
Managing policy process	State keeps monopoly over the implementation process, deploying administrative system as framework for clientelistic exchange and monitoring	Design of framework for decentralisation, outsourcing and devolution to non-state actors while integrating it in the existing network of clientelistic exchange.	Enabling outsourcing and devolution while opening space for engagement of non-state actors in implementation process
Managing inter-organisational relations	Vertical chain of political control over de-concentrated, and rarely decentralized, implementing bodies	Ensuring symbolic performance and compliance with service contract, but real focus on enforcement of the *clientelist* bargain	Investing efforts in realization of partnership and contractual obligations
Managing (external and internal) inter-personal contacts	Enhancing internalization of orientation to the clientelistic exchange	Monitoring brokers and enhancing compliance of street level staff with clientelistic setting	Fostering service orientation, professionalization and introduction of users's perspective.
Role of government in implementation process	Clientelistic guardian	Clientelistic capo	Chairperson/ Regulator/inspector

Adopded according to Hill and Hupe (2009)

Diagram 1: CHAIN(S) OF CAUSALITY IN PhD PROJECT

CAUSAL MECHANISMS

| Independent V: Types of politicians – citizens' strategic linkages in specific social policy | Int. V: Political executive strategy toward integration of administrative reform | Int. V: Application of governance instruments | Dependent V: Reform outcomes in implementation practice- modes of operational governance in specific social policy |

Direct clientelistic exchange with policy target population (social clientelism)

Resistance to integration of reform principles into governance of specific policy

-replacing public service values with political values
- transforming civil servants into clientelistic brokers

Clientelistic bureaucratic enforcement– government acting as clientelistic guardian

Predominately **mediated clientelistic exchange** with social service providers, and to some extent, direct exchange with the target group

Selective and modified integration of reform principles into clientelistic network within specific policy

-introducing outsourcing, decentralization, devolution but without control mechanisms
-transforming clientelistic clients into service providers

Technocratic clientelism- performance through clientelistic network with government acting as clientelistic capo

Programmatic policy competition

Symbolic and partial integration of reform principles into governance of specific policy

-limited, often symbolical, usage of some meta-governance tools (performance management, trust and values)

Performance and co-production - governance by persuasion and contract with government acting as chairperson or regulator/inspector

Long lasting domination of single partiy in state aparatus

Agreement on reforms: fusion of emphasis of some outcome-based elements of NPM, with a more democratic understanding of citizens' participation on level of rhetoric.

Type of capitalism – quasi-criminal transformation of social ownership – "clientelistic crony capitalism"

Transition from planned to free market economy, from single-party to multy-party system

Condition variables

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Methodology

To test proposed explanation of diversity and characteristics of reform outcomes in implementation management of specific social policies in Croatia this PhD project will use process tracing format. The cause-effect link which connects independent variable (modes of politician-citizen's linkages) with the outcomes of reform process in implementation management will be unwrapped and divided into smaller steps. In order to do so, in initial phase, prediction of causal mechanisms (political executive strategy toward integration of administrative reform and application of governance instruments) and framework proposed for the analysis of dependent variable (modes of operational governance) will be further elaborated and operationalized.

As the main hypothesis of PhD project consist of three chains of causality (Diagram 1), each initiated by one of three modes of politician-citizens linkages causing corresponding reform outcome in implementation management of specific social policy, process tracing will be designed and conducted to look for observable evidence of all links in each of three causal chains. Accordingly, three cases of specific social policies will be selected - each qualified with significant presence of elements of one of modes of politician-citizens linkages. The initial case selection in presented in following table.

Table 3: INITIAL CASE SELECTION – SPECIFIC SOCIAL POLICY IN RELATION TO THREE MODES OF POLITICIANS-CITIZENS STRATEGIC LINKAGES (INDEPENDENT VARIABLE)

Elements	Direct clientelistic exchange with target group	Mediated clientelistic exchange with service providers	Programmatic policy Competition
Beneficiaries of clientelistic exchange	Target group acting as broad electoral mass and identifiable constituency	Primarily party supporters acting as service providers in homes for elderly, day care, house care	NONE
Political power of target group	Strong: mobilization capacities, number of votes	Minor	Small
Resistance/compliance of target group to clientelistic control over policy	Majority of target group was accepting clientelistic relation	Target group was lacking of political voice (still dominant medical approach) to resist clientelistic capture	Target group was lacking political voice
Resistance/ compliance of veto actors in specific policy to clientelistic control over policy	NO active or effective	NO active or effective	Strong actors (advocacy NGO international organizations) with veto powers resisting to clientelitic capture
Club goods as benefits in exchange	Dominant: example s are differential access to social insurance benefits, tax schemas,	Partially- with selected parts of TG (perhaps based on territorial voting preferences)	Disbursement in terms of general rules while hoping that distributive impact will create enough support for party.
Private goods as benefits in exchange.	Partially (privileged access to public sector employment)	Dominant: examples are jobs in elderly care institutions/program, procurement contracts	NO
Selected cases - social policy/ policy area:	Policy for war veterans	Care for elderly	Protection of children without parental care

In accordance with process tracing format proposed explanation will be primarily tested with usage of observations within selected cases (Van Evier, 1997). At the final stage, observations will be also compared across cases. Observation will look for evidence visible in sequences and structures of events, decision on institutions, procedures and governing mechanism, testimonies of actors of selected policies. Search for evidence will focus on ten years period between 2000/2001 and 2011. Years 2000/2001 demarcate the start of administrative reform process and the late 2011 is the year of last change of government in which HDZ lost elections. Combination of planed sources and methods of data/evidence collection is presented in following table:

Table 4: INITIAL COMBINATION OF SOURCES AND METHODS FOR DATA COLLECTION

SOURCES	METHODS
Policy documents (budget, strategic plans/legal acts, action plans, monitoring framework, annual reports, statistical reports)	Document analysis and, when possible, statistical analysis
Politicians with experience in selected policies (former/current ministers, former state secretaries-current political advisors of ministers, members of parliaments)	Individual semi-structured interviews
Representatives of oversight bodies (ombudsman offices)	Individual semi-structured interviews
Civil servants (high and middle rank) in ministries that were coordinating selected policies (heads of sectors, departments and sections in ministries)	Individual semi-structured interviews
Coordinators in civil society organisations active in selected policies (some advocacy organisations, other service providers or both)	Focus groups or group interviews
International organisations and consultants active in selected policies	Individual semi-structured interviews
Directors/coordinators public or private institutions/organisations providing services in selected policies	Individual semi-structured interviews
Service providers /street level workers in public, private and non-profit organisations	Individual semi-structured interviews- option is usage of Qmethod
Beneficiaries of selected policies	Individual or group semi-structured interviews

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